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The African Holocaust: Should Europe
for
to Africa
Reparations
Pay
Colonialism and Slavery?*
ABSTRACT

For many people of European descent, slavery is little more
than an unpleasant memory of a bygone and distant era, largely
remembered more for the glory of empires lost and faded dreams
of conquest and exploration. For many Africans and African
Americans, however, slavery remains an unhealed wound that
is frequently, if not constantly, reopened by feelings of continued
oppression, manipulation, and discrimination. These disparate
views clashed most recently at the U.N. World Conference
Against Racism, held in Durban, South Africa in September of
2001.
Inspired by the U.N. Conference in Durban, this Note
analyzes the potential for reparations between European and
African countries as a possible solution to the lingering issues of
slavery and colonialism. It does not argue for or against
African reparations. Rather, this Note traces the historical
development of the reparations concept through treaties and
judicial action and addresses the legal andpractical viability of
reparationsfor African states.
Throughout the analysis, this Note emphasizes the moral
forces that permeate this area of international law. The law
among states is largely defined by changing humanitarian
ideals. Although this Note does not attempt to critique the

* The Author's use of the term "African Holocaust" is not in any way intended
to
discount the importance of the Jewish Holocaust. In this instance, the Author uses the
term to simultaneously recognize the extent of African suffering during the slave trade,
and to signal to the reader that a comparison of the two genocidal events will comprise
a significant part of this Note.
At the time of publication for this Note, the authors of four previous law review
articles used the term "African Holocaust." See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:
Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998);
El-Obaid Ahmed El-Obaid & Kwando Appiagyei-Atua, Human Rights In Africa-A
New Perspective On Linking The Past To The Present, 41 MCGILL L.J. 819 (1996);
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the Argument
For Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1999); David
Abraham & Kimberly A. McCoy, Dealing With Histories of Oppression: Black And
Jewish Reactions To Passivity And Collaboration In William Styron's Confessions of
Nat TurnerAnd HannahArendt's Eichmann In Jerusalem, 2 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
87 (2000).
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ultimate merits of these humanitarianarguments, it recognizes
that their influence must be considered to properly evaluate the
potentialfor African reparations.
By evaluating the legal avenues and pitfalls for African
reparations, this Note seeks to advance the reparations
discussion toward a permanentsolution that is acceptable to all.

Compensation for the oppressed is not the objective; nor is
absolution for the oppressors. The real goal should be a 'lasting
peace, devoid of both feelings of victimization and of undue
blame. Humanity must find a way to put the issues of slavery
and colonization to rest. Only by understanding the moral
forces behind the dynamic concept of international human
rights can a resolution that does not inspire future resentment
be found.
To that end, this Note evaluates the development of the
reparations concept since World War II regarding the Nazi
Holocaust and other human rights violations. It discusses
actions under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in light of judicial obstacles such as
the Act of State Doctrine, the Nonjusticiable Question Doctrine,
and the statute of limitations. Throughout the discussion, this
Note brings to light the underlying sentiments that motivate the
pursuit of reparations, encourage or discourage resolution by
treaty or judicial settlement, and continue to inspire feelings of
resentment and subjugation. Finally, this judicial and moral
framework is superimposed onto African reparation claims for
slavery and colonization to evaluate possible solutions through
treatiesor judicial action.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In early September 2001, delegates from the world's Western
democracies joined representatives from across the globe at the U.N.
World Conference Against Racism (WCAR or Conference), expecting a
celebration of global tolerance and diversity.' The Conference was
intended to showcase a new global community, characterized by a
sweeping moral commonality on human rights issues and a
condemnation of the now supposedly universally-recognized
reprehensibility of slavery and colonization. 2 Delegates from the
Western states expected to revel in the moral progress the
international community has made since the earliest days of the
3
League of Nations.

Rachel L. Swarns, Race Talks Finally Reach Accord On Slavery and
1.
PalestinianPlight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at 1.
Id.
2.
Id. For the purposes of this Note, the term "Western" refers to the states of
3.
western Europe, the United States and Canada.
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What they found, instead, was an atmosphere of divisiveness
that threatened to undermine the entire Conference. 4 European
delegates were dismayed by lingering resentment over slavery and
colonization.5 Rather than easily passing a resolution against race
and gender discrimination, the delegates were faced with the
possibility of being condemned for centuries of slave trading and
colonialism. 6 Ultimately, the WCAR served not as a shining example
of global unity, but as a reminder of the deep-rooted divisions that
7
continue to plague the international community.

II.

FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR AFRICA

The perception of the reparation issue is fundamentally different
for Africans than for African Americans. "While slavery is the family
history that defines the African-American community, it is for many
Africans an abstraction of the past, overshadowed by Africa's later
Although the African
struggles against European colonialism."
reparation movement necessarily includes many of the same claims of
oppression and unjust enrichment as the African American
perspective regarding slavery, the African view also focuses on the
lingering economic effects of colonialism. 9 In particular, the African
reparation movement concentrates on debt forgiveness rather than
the educational and social reforms sought in the United States. l '
Judge Fouad Ammoun of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
described the development of Africa "before there fell upon it the two
greatest plagues in the recorded history of mankind: the slave-trade,
which ravaged Africa for centuries on an unprecedented scale; and
colonialism, which exploited humanity and natural wealth to a
relentless extreme."'" Although Africa is largely in ruins today, it
once boasted thriving states and empires dating back to Roman
times. 12 However, the economic position of modern Africa has
continued to decline in the latter half of the twentieth century. For
instance, the per capita income in Zaire dropped from $210 in 1968 to

4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
Id.
7.
8.
Samson Mulugeta, Seeing Slavery's Legacy; U.S. Blacks, Africans Differ,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 2, 2001, at A7.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
11.
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 86 (1971) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
12.
Id.
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$79 in 1983.13 The rapid descent of per capita income is due to the
combined effects of explosive population growth, a decline in
agricultural production, and a stagnant industrial sector. 14 Some
authors attribute Africa's poor agricultural and industrial
performance to structural dependence on the West.' 5 According to
this view, European countries manipulate individual African states
into producing the specific commodities desired in Europe to the
detriment of the overall African economy. 16 For instance, one country
may be encouraged to concentrate on exporting a particular mineral
to the point of depletion, while another is geared towards producing a
particular cash crop such as coffee or cotton. 17 The net result is that
the African state is forced to import all of its other basic materials
18
from Europe.
The situation in Africa has deteriorated to the point that some
commentators suggest that it should be written off as a lost cause and
that the West should invest elsewhere.' 9 The total debt of Africa,
nearly $200 billion, is largely the result of African dependence on the
Additionally, the
West for food, machinery, and technology. 20
massive debt gives Europe and the United States a disproportionate
Some
influence over the internal affairs of the African states. 21
commentators contend that the West uses the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to force the African states to
develop along a prescribed economic model as a condition to
borrowing additional money. 22 This internal meddling by the West
inspires many of the deepest feelings of humiliation, frustration, and
23
anger among African states.
African states also attribute their continued underdevelopment
to the desire by Europe and the United States to install African
leaders who are easy to manipulate. 24 The result is what many
Many Afiicahs are
Africans call "Africa's leadership crisis. '25
disillusioned after decades of coups, corruption, abuses of power and

13.
KINFE ABRAHAM, THE MISSING MILLIONS: WHY AND How AFRICA IS
UNDERDEVELOPED 2 (1995).
14.
Id. at 2-3.
15.
ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 4-5; WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE
UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 25 (1982).
ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 4.
16.

17.
18.

Id.
Id.

19.

ECONOMIC

JUSTICE

IN

AFRICA:

ADJUSTMENT

AND

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 1 (George W. Shepherd, Jr. & Karamo N.M. Sonko eds., 1994).
HASKELL GEORGE WARD, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW
20.
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CONTINENT 22 (1989).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 19.
WARD, supra note 20, at 31-34.
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human rights, and blind acceptance of advice from the West. 26 The
installation of weak or incompetent leaders complements a policy of
balkanization that promotes regional conflict and keeps African
states susceptible to foreign influence. 27 Some authors suggest that
the European powers intentionally prolong conflicts in Africa by
providing arms, personnel, technical assistance, and financial support
to achieve their own national agendas. 28 Beyond the destabilizing
effects of extended disputes, armed conflicts are also a tremendous
drain on the limited resources of Africa. 29 Africa spends eight billion
dollars annually on its militaries. 30 There are approximately 16
countries involved in civil conflicts that have produced over 6.5
million refugees and 17 million displaced Africans. 3 1 Currently,
Zaire, Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia are at or near a
state of collapse. 32
Many of the states in Africa have been
undermined or overturned with such frequency that there are very
33
few truly legitimate regimes or institutions to stabilize the region.
However, some commentators contend that the West is not at all
responsible for the conditions of Africa. 34 They contend that "many of
the Asian and African colonies progressed very rapidly during
colonial rule, much more so than the independent countries in the
same area." 35
Additionally, the debt owed by African states
represents resources that have been supplied to them, often
supplemented with outright grants or aid. 36 "Difficulties of servicing
these debts do not reflect external exploitation or unfavourable terms
of trade. They are the result of wasteful use of the capital supplied,
or inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies. '37 P.T. Bauer contends
that "[t]he principal assumption behind the idea of Western
responsibility for Third World poverty is that the prosperity of
individuals and societies [in the West] generally reflects exploitation
'
of others [in Africa]. 38

26.
Id.
27.
ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 13.
28.
Basil Enwegbara, Africa-at-large; Need for African Military Force, AFRICA
NEWS, July 24, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Afrnws File.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.

34.

P.T. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD, AND ECONOMIC DELUSION 75

(1982).
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.

38.

Id. at 75.
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THE UPWARD MARCH OF MANKIND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is not a fixed body of rules. Rather, it is an
evolving, dynamic indicator of the collective moral progress among
and within nations. Judge Ammoun of the ICJ eloquently remarked
on the evolution of mankind's struggle with the issues of slavery and
colonization in his separate opinion in Legal Consequences For States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276:
Historians have outlined the upward march of mankind from the time
when homo sapiens appeared on the face of the globe, first of all in the
Near East in what was the land of Canaan, up to the age of the greatest
thinkers and, more particularly, throughout the whole of history of
social progress, from the slavery of Antiquity to man's inevitable,
irreversible drive towards equality and freedom. This march is like
time itself. It never stops. Nothing can stand in its way for long. The
texts, whether they be laws, constitutions, declarations, covenants or
charters, do but define it and mark its successive phases. They are a
mere record of it. In other words, the progressive rights which men and
peoples enjoy are the result much less of those texts than of the human
39
progress to which they bear witness.

Judge Ammoun reflected on the evolution of international law in this
case because it involved South African control over the political
independence of Namibia. The U.N. Security Council called upon the
ICJ to issue an advisory opinion regarding the legal consequences of
South Africa's continued operation in Namibia as a mandatory, or
national, tutor. 40 South Africa was empowered to act as a tutor for
the developing state of Namibia under Article 22 of the League of
Nations Covenant. 41 Paragraph 2 of Article 22 provides that "this
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience
or their
geographical
position can best undertake
this
responsibility.. .on behalf of the League. '42 In rejecting the continued
authority of South Africa to function as a mandatory for Namibia, the
ICJ reasoned that the United Nations contemplated an international
trusteeship system that would provide a wider and more effective
43
form of supervision for developing nations.
In support of the majority opinion, Judge Ammoun retraced the
development of positive international law concerning the rights to

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

1971 IC.J. 16, 72-73 (1971) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
Id. at 17, 23.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
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self-determination and international sovereignty. 44 He characterized
the evolution of international law as "the fight of the peoples for
freedom and independence, which has been going on ever since there
have been conquering and dominating peoples and subject but
unsubjugated peoples. '45 The right of self determination "before
being written into charters that were not granted but won in bitter
struggle, had first been written painfully, with the blood of peoples, in
the finally awakened conscience of humanity. '46 Judge Ammoun
traced the origins of equality, not to the Greek philosophers Plato and
Aristotle "who both found words to justify inequality and slavery," but
to the stoic philosophy of Zeno. 4 7 "The stoic philosophy, sowing for
the first time in mankind's history the seeds of equality between men
and between nations, influenced the greatest of the Roman
jurisconsults ... and then the doctors of Christianity through whom
'48
it was eventually transmitted to the Age of Reason.
To a large extent, international law of the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries developed according to the
treaties made among five or six of the great powers of Europe. 49 The
agreements were often used to justify slavery, colonization, and
conquest. 50 Many of those treaty norms survived the formation of the
League of Nations and the United Nations to become imbedded in
modern international law. 51
Understandably, many developing
states dispute the legitimacy of certain rules, not only because they
were not involved in formulating them, but also because the rules do
not reflect their developmental needs as former colonies. 52 Third
World countries have had a profound impact on the development of
human rights since the formation of the United Nations by adding a
sense of natural justice, morality, and humane ideals to traditional
53
Western concepts of state sovereignty in international law.

44.
Id. at 74.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 77-78.
48.
Id.
49.
Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 308
(1970) (separate opinion of Judge Amnmoun).
50.
Id., Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 86 (citing the 1885 Berlin Congress which held Africa to be terrae
nullius). The term terrae nullius was used to describe geographic areas where the
inhabitants lacked sufficient social and political organization to constitute independent
sovereignty. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (1975).
Western colonial powers
could acquire sovereign rights over such "territory belonging to no-one" through simple
occupation or conquest. Id.
51.
Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. at 308.
52.
Id. at 310.
53.
Id. at 310-11.
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IV. CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the past, traditional international law was largely restricted
to relations between states.5 4 The individual was not considered a
proper "subject" of international law. 55
Therefore, traditional
international law contained few restrictions on a state's conduct
toward foreign nationals. 5 6 Those restrictions were largely confined
to preventing denials of justice that limited a foreign national's access
to the courts. 57 Traditionally, the injury to an individual was
considered to be an injury to the state of his nationality. 58 "The
offense being to the state, the remedy for the violation also runs to
the state, although the injured person may have to exhaust domestic
remedies before the state of nationality can formally seek reparation
for the offense." 59 Although a state did possess limited authority in
traditional international law to seek redress for injuries to its
nationals by other countries, no state was permitted to interfere with
60
another state's treatment of its own citizens.
The modern concept of human rights in international law has
developed extensively since the end of the World War 11.61 One of the
founding purposes of the United Nations was "to achieve
international co-operation ... in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion. '62
The
contemporary international law of human rights reflects general
acceptance of two basic ideals. 63 First, every human being should
64
have basic rights that are recognized and protected by his country.
Second, the recognition and protection of those rights, even by states
65
toward their own citizens, is the proper subject of international law.
These basic assumptions are reflected in three major documents that
66
form the basis of contemporary human rights in international law.
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948, outlining a universal standard of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights.6 7 This document. laid

54.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

pt. VII, introductory note (1987).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
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the foundation for both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.6 8 Agreements such as these, and the actions of
states in accordance with them, have led to the development of a
69
customary international law of human rights.
A state violates the customary international law of human rights
if it practices, encourages, or condones genocide, slavery, murder,
70
torture, racial discrimination, or arbitrary imprisonment.
Generally, a state is not responsible for human rights violations by
71
private individuals unless the state actively encourages the activity.
The state is not liable for failing to enact or enforce laws prohibiting
most human rights violations by private individuals. 72 However,
states have a duty under international law to make genocide a crime,
and may have additional obligations if they are parties to one of the
human rights agreements. 73 For instance, a party to the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is liable for human rights violations by
persons acting under color of state law, even if their actions were
contrary to state policy. 74 Slavery, like genocide and other essential
human rights, has been incorporated into the jus cogens body of
No state may violate these
customary international law. 75
fundamental human rights, regardless of whether that state 76is a
party to an agreement providing for the protection of such rights.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

pt. VII, § 702 (1987).
,71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. BIRTH OF THE REPARATIONS CONCEPT

A. InternationalCondemnation of the Crime of Genocide
Slavery in the United States ended in 186577 with the end of the
Civil War. 78 The international community took its first steps toward
eradicating the slave trade with the International Convention to
Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of 1926. 79 The U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution regarding the right of nations to
determine their own course of national and cultural development in
December 1952, and affirmed the independence of colonial countries
and peoples in December 1960.80 Since the former colonies gained
their independence, the devastation of slavery and colonization has
been overshadowed to a large degree by the issue of Holocaust
reparations. Nevertheless, the efforts toward reparations for Nazi
genocide form a useful model for examining the growing international
concept of reparations.
The international community began taking steps to prevent
similar international atrocities immediately following World War 11.81
In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide

77.

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 declared "forever free" the
slaves in those Confederate states still in rebellion. The blacks in the
loyal Border States were not affected, nor were those in specific
The presidential pen did not formally
conquered areas in the South....
strike the shackles from a single slave. Where Lincoln could presumably
free the slaves-that is, in the loyal Border States-he refused to do so,
lest he spur disunion.

THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLIC 457-60 (9th ed. 1991).
78.

[Lincoln's] immediate goal was not so much to liberate the slaves as to
strengthen the moral cause of the Union at home and abroad. This he
succeeded in doing. At the same time, Lincoln's proclamation, though of
dubious constitutionality, clearly foreshadowed the ultimate doom of
slavery. This was legally achieved by action of the states and by their
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, eight months after the
Civil War had ended.

Id. at 458.
International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept.
79.
25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Slavery Convention].
Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 311
80.
(1970).
Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence
81.
of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 HOus. J. INT'L L. 467, 469-71 (2001).
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82
Convention), in large part because of the memory of the Holocaust.
The Genocide Convention proclaimed that genocide 83 is a crime under
international law, whether committed in a time of peace or war and
regardless of whether it is done for religious, political, or other
reasons. 84 Although the Genocide Convention is limited to protecting
national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups,8 5 it is still an important
86
step toward preventing another event similar to the Holocaust.
Prosecutions for atrocities began almost immediately after the end of
World War 11.87 In the first major post-war genocide case, Adolf
Eichmann was executed by Israel for his role in exterminating the
Jews. 88 The Genocide Convention, in conjunction with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Nuremburg Trials, and the
Nuremburg Principles, form the foundation of the modern concept of
89
international human rights.

B. Social and PoliticalDynamics Underlying the Call for Reparations
The concept of Holocaust reparations for lost wages and lost
property cannot be separated from the massive loss of life that
90
accompanied the persecution of the Jewish people.
We are talking about crimes committed in anticipation of the
Holocaust, accompanying the Holocaust, or in consequence of it. In a
word, we are talking about thefticide-the greatest mass theft on the
occasion of the greatest mass murder in history. . . . [Blehind every
dormant Swiss account, behind every plundered property, behind every
gold dental bridge, behind every unrecovered insurance policy, is the
91
narrative/horror of the Holocaust.

To a large extent, Holocaust reparations were driven by the
convergence of three different perspectives on the atrocities of Nazi
Germany. First, Germany was eager to escape the stigma associated

82.

Id. at 471-72.

83.

The term genocide was first used in RAPHAEL LEMICIN, AXIS RULE IN

OCCUPIED EUROPE,

at xi-xii (1944). See also Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it

Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 453 n.93

(1998).
84.
Westley, supra note 83, at 470-72.
85.
Political groups, women, homosexuals, and professional groups are not
protected by the Genocide Convention. Id. at 484-85.
86.
Id. at 471-72.
87.
Id. at 492-93.
88.
Adolf Eichmann was the Head of Jewish Affairs for the Gestapo in Nazi
Germany. Id. at 492-94.
89.
Irwin Cotler, The Holocaust, Thefticide, and Restitution: A Legal
Perspective, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 601 (1998).
90.
Id. at 602.
91.
Id. at 602-03.
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with its role in the Holocaust.9 2 Second, the Jewish survivors were
understandably driven to regain at least a portion of the personal and
familial wealth lost during their persecution. 93 Third and most
complex, the former Allied Powers wished to aid 94the Jewish people
without hindering future developments elsewhere.
However, the United States and other Allied Powers were
somewhat reluctant to support the Jewish claims for reparations
against Germany for several reasons. The United States feared it
would ultimately bear the cost of the reparations as it attempted to
rebuild Germany under the Marshall Plan.9 5 Further, the United
States was also concerned that the financial burden of reparations
would hinder Germany's recovery and that U.S. support of the Jewish
claims would undermine U.S. attempts to secure Germany as an
96
ally.
A fourth opposition to the development of Holocaust reparations
included several of the European countries that either conducted
business with, or were occupied by, Germany. These countries
developed a "series of myths, anchored both in revisionist law and
revisionist history, that sought to deny, escape, insulate, or immunize
states and their government agents [from] responsibility for
restitution. ' 97 Austria, for instance, claimed that it was really the
first victim of Nazi aggression when it was annexed by Germany in
March 1938.98 Likewise, France asserted that the Vichy regime that
controlled France during German occupation was a foreign
government for which the it could not be held responsible. 99 Similar
myths developed in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Eastern
Europe-all with the purpose of shifting the blame for collaboration,
association, and acquiescence in the Holocaust. 10 0
The significance of this fourth perspective, embodied in national
sentiments of nonresponsibility, lies not in questionable historical
accuracy, but in what the existence of such myths says about
assigning moral blame to national groups. Nations 10 ' are generally
and understandably unwilling to scrutinize their roles in
transcendent horrors like the Holocaust.' 0 2 Such introspection may

92.

Westley, supra note 83, at 454-55 n.103 (citing NANA SAGI, GERMAN

REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 1-2 (1980)).

93.
Id.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
96.
Id.
Cotler, supra note 89, at 603.
97.
98.
Id.
Id. at 605.
99.
Id. at 603-12.
100.
The author uses the term nations to denote the ethnic polity of a region,
101.
such as the French or German peoples, rather than the State of France or Germany.
102.
Cotler, supra note 89, at 603-12.
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undermine national pride and necessitate a broad re-evaluation of
national conduct toward other groups.
An example of this
phenomenon is the payment of reparations by the United States to
Japanese Americans interned during World War II,- discussed
03
below.'

VI. REPARATIONS BY TREATY

A. The Power of Moral Pressure,

Treaty reparations for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust began
immediately following World War II. Germany voluntarily agreed to
compensate the survivors of the Holocaust under the leadership of
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who believed the German people owed
a moral duty to compensate- the Jewish people for their: material
losses and suffering.' 0 4 In September 1952, Germany signed the
Luxembourg Agreements that formed the basis of the unprecedented
Weidergutmachung legislation designed to compensate Jewish
victims.10 5 As David Ben Gurion remarked,
There is a great moral and political significance to be found in the
Agreement itself. For the first time in the history of relations between
people, a precedent has been created by which a great State, as a result
of moral pressure alone, takes it upon itself to pay compensation to the
victims of the government that preceded it. For the first time in the
history of a people that has been persecuted, oppressed, plundered and
despoiled for hundreds of years in the countries of Europe a persecutor
and despoiler has been obliged to return part of his spoils and has even
undertaken to make collective reparation as partial compensation for
10 6
the material losses.

The Luxenbourg Agreements reunified Germany and created a fund
to compensate Holocaust victims who were imprisoned in
concentration camps for at least six months, isolated in ghettos, or in
hiding for at least eighteen months. 0 7 The Allied Powers also forced
Imperial Japan to pay reparations to Allied prisoners of war in the

103.
The United States was forced to critically evaluate its own violation of the
rights of Japanese Americans during World War II as a result of U.S. support of the
Jewish reparations claims. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
104.
Westley, supra note 83, at 454-55.
105.
Id. at 455.
106.
Id. at 455-56.
107.
Marilyn Henry, Germany Okays Extension of Reparation Fund, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 5, 1996, at 18.
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1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.10 8 Notably, treaties, rather than
judicial proceedings, created all of these early forms of reparations.
Other nations have also addressed the issue of reparations for
their own past actions. In 1994, the Japanese legislature considered
the issue of reparations for victims of the atomic bombings of
The Japanese government also
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 0 9
established a private fund of six million dollars to compensate Asian
"comfort women" forced to serve the Imperial Japanese Army in
World War 1.110 Also in 1994, the Austrian government took steps to
normalize relations with Israel by considering payment of reparations
to Holocaust victims. 1 1' In 2001, French and U.S. officials negotiated
a settlement to end litigation brought against French banks that held
Jewish assets and were looted by the Nazis during World War 11.112
B. Overcoming Reluctance to Look Inward
Several of the aforementioned countries are still criticized for
being too slow to acknowledge their responsibility for atrocities
committed during World War II. "The trouble with Austria, in
contrast to Germany, is the lingering perception of a former Nazi
country that has been too slow and too shallow in recognizing the
enormous responsibility it has to the Jewish people." 113 Likewise,
"the Japanese have never admitted their culpability or paid more
than derisory amounts in compensation to their victims. 1 14
In order to champion the cause of reparations for Holocaust
victims, the United States needed to turn a critical eye to its own
conduct in World War I11.5 On August 10, 1988 President Reagan
signed the Civil Liberties Act authorizing the payment of $1.2 billion
to the families of Japanese Americans interned during World War
1I.116 The Civil Liberties Act is the earliest U.S. precedent of
compensation for racially motivated acts. 117 In recent years, this

108.
Yuichi Shibata Yomiuri Shimbun, Britain Abandoned POW claims in '55,
DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 17, 1998, at 2.
109.
Premier Wary Over A-bomb Reparations, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, July 23,
1994, LEXIS, News Library, Mainws File.
110.
Japan Establishes Private Fund for "Comfort Women" Reparations,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Apr. 7, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
111.
Two Cheers for Austria, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at 6.
112.
Angela Doland, France Nears Agreement on Holocaust Reparations,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 10, 2001, at 6.
113.
Two Cheers for Austria, supra note 111.
Andrew Roberts, The Debt Japan Owes These Men, DAILY MAIL (LONDON),
114.
Sept. 17, 1993, at 28.
Westley, supra note 83, at 451; A Debt of Honor, WASH. POST, Oct. '3, 1989,
115.
at A24.
A Debt of Honor, supra note 115.
116.
117.
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 677. 713-14 (1999).
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aggressive self-investigation has expanded to form the basis for the
slavery reparation issue in the United States. "As a world leader
emphasizing the need for international relations grounded upon
democracy and human rights, the United States [must] face the
dilemma of how to deal with its own past and its most egregious
historical injustices, an obvious example being the legacy of
slavery."118

VII. REPARATIONS IN THE COURTS

A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The courts, rather than the political arena, have increasingly
become the forum for reparations disputes around the world.
However, a growing concern exists among Jewish leaders that the
Holocaust reparations are often misrepresented as a simple property
dispute. 119 They point out:
[C]ompensation is not just about money, it is about the symbolic
recognition of a moral debt, and a commitment to teach new
generations. Nobody wants to paint respectable modern German
companies with a Nazi tar brush. Six million people were murdered
because they were Jews, and for them or their relatives, there is no
compensation on earth. But as a secondary crime, they were also
robbed. That is an issue we can and should do something about.
120
Wherever it is still possible, it is still necessary.

A significant body of law has developed in the United States for
the adjudication of international human rights claims in U.S.
courts. 121 The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted by Congress in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, originally provided for federal jurisdiction
in international cases involving alien plaintiffs. 122 Filartigav. PenaIrala is the seminal case involving the ATCA. 123 In that decision, the
court held that a claim involving deliberate torture fell within federal
subject matter jurisdiction because such torture violated the
customary norms of well-established international law. 124 Dr. Joel
Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly Filartiga, were citizens of the

118.

Id. at 677.

119.

Id.

120.
Id.
121.
Derek Brown, Litigating the Holocaust: A Consistent Theory in Tort for the
Private Enforcement of Human Rights Violations, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 553, 563 (2000).
122.

Id.

123.
124.

Id.
Id.
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Republic of Paraguay. 125 Dr. Filartiga was a longstanding opponent
1 26
of the government of Paraguay under President Alfredo Stroessner.
Dolly Filartiga arrived in the United States in 1978 and subsequently
applied for permanent political asylum. 127 The Filartigas alleged
that Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena) wrongfully caused the death
of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son, Joelito, by the use of
torture. 128 They contended that Pena, then Inspector General of the
Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, kidnapped and tortured Joelito
Filartiga. 129 Asuncion Police took Dolly Filartiga to Pena's home and
confronted her with Joelito's body. 130 As Dolly fled from the house,
Pena followed after her shouting, "Here you have what you have been
looking for for so long and what you deserve. Now shut up."'1 31 Dr.
Filartiga brought a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts, but
government officials allegedly threatened his attorney with murder
13 2
and inexplicably disbarred him.
Pena moved to the United States in 1978 under a visitor's
visa.133 Upon learning of his presence in the United States, the
Filartigas commenced this action in U.S. federal court under the
ATCA and international human rights law. 134 The Second Circuit
held that deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of state
authority is contrary to the customary international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. 135 The court also
held that the ATCA provided federal jurisdiction where an alleged
torturer is present within the borders of the United States and is
served with process by a foreign national. 136 The Second Circuit
recognized that the United States "is bound both to observe and
construe the accepted norms of international law, formerly known as
The court explained that in order to
the law of nations."'1 37
"[i]mplement[ I the constitutional mandate for national control over
foreign relations, the First Congress established original district
court jurisdiction over 'all causes where an alien sues for a tort only
In order to
[committed] in violation of the law of nations.""' 138
determine the appropriate sources of international law, the Second

125.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
126.
Id.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 878-79.
135.
Id. at 880.
136.
Id. at 878, 887-88.
Id. at 877.
137.
Id. at 878 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789)
138.
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
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Circuit looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance. 139 The
Supreme Court has said that international law "may be ascertained
by consulting the works of jurists, writings professedly on public law;
or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
140
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.'
B. The Act of State Doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act
Based on the Filartigadecision, other U.S. courts have entered
judgments against former foreign government officials for human
rights violations. In In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos, Human Rights
Litigation, the Ninth Circuit held the estate of the former President
of the Philippines liable for $1.2 billion in damages for human rights
violations. 14 1 Up to ten thousand people in the Philippines were
allegedly tortured, executed, or abducted by military intelligence
forces during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. 142 President
Marcos fled the Philippines to Hawaii with his family and loyal
supporters in 1986.143 Survivors and family members of victims who
suffered under the Marcos administration from 1971 to 1986 soon
filed several lawsuits. 144 The suits were consolidated into a class
action in 1991. The Ninth Circuit rejected the assertion that Marcos'
actions while President of the Philippines were protected by the Act
of State Doctrine in an unpublished opinion. 145 The Act of State
Doctrine provides:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, courts in the United States will generally
refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of
property within its own territory, or from sitting in judgment on other
acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own
146
territory and applicable there.

The Ninth Circuit stated that "[e]ven though characterized as a
dictator, [Marcos] was not himself the sovereign-government-of
Venezuela within the Act of State Doctrine. ' 14 7 The court also held

139.
Id. at 880.
140.
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
141.
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1480
(9th Cir. 1994); Brown, supra note 121, at 563 n.101.
142.
In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 25 F.3d at 1469.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 1470.
146.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

pt. IV, ch. 1, § 443(1).
147.
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1471 (quoting Jiminez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962)).
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that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not prevent
the court from exercising jurisdiction over foreign officials who act
beyond the scope' of their authority. 148 The FSIA provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief
in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any
14 9
applicable international agreement.

The court treated the allegations of torture as true for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, and reasoned that acts such as torture and
15 0
abduction were beyond the scope of Marcos' authority as president.
The court recognized that the FSIA is subject to restrictive
interpretation that limits sovereign immunity to inherently
governmental acts, but does not prevent jurisdiction over commercial
or private acts of foreign individuals or instrumentalities. 15 1 Because
Marcos acted beyond the scope of his inherent governmental
authority, and because "the prohibition against official torture carries
with it the force of a jus cogens norm, which enjoys the highest status
within international law," the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
52
court's assertion of federal jurisdiction. 1
The Estate of Marcos (The Estate) also argued that federal
jurisdiction was prohibited by the arising-under clause of Article III
of the U.S. Constitution. 153 The Estate contended that Article III
required at least one of the parties to be a U.S. citizen. 154 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument by relying on Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, a Supreme Court decision that employed a broad
conception of the arising-under clause to empower Congress to grant
federal subject matter jurisdiction in disputes involving foreign
plaintiffs. 155 Under the court's reasoning, actions against a foreign
state under the FSIA necessarily involve issues of substantive federal
law and therefore arise under federal law within the meaning of
156
Article III of the Constitution.

148.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
(1983)).
156.

Id. at 1470.

28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2002).
In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 25 F.3d at 1470-72.
Id. at 1472.
Id. at 1473.
Id. at 1474.
Id.
Id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492
Id.
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The role of the FSIA in actions arising from World War II
atrocities has not yet been adequately settled. 157 Hugo Princz, a U.S.
citizen and Holocaust survivor, filed suit in 1992 against the Federal
Republic of Germany to recover money damages for injuries and slave
labor he endured as a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps. 158
Ruling that the lawsuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court
declined to answer whether the FSIA, enacted in 1976, applied
159
retroactively to the events of World War II.
From 1812 to 1952,
the U.S. State Department routinely requested immunity in all cases
involving friendly foreign governments.160
The international
community began to exclude commercial and private acts from the
protection of sovereign immunity during the first half of the
twentieth century. 16 ' This restrictive approach was incorporated into
U.S. jurisprudence in 1952 when the State Department began
requesting immunity for friendly governments on a case-by-case
basis. 162 The FSIA substantially codified this approach in 1976.163
Therefore, most courts apply the FSIA only to events after 1952.164
However, the court recognized a strong argument favoring retroactive
application of the FSIA to events before 1952.165 Congress provided
that "[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity
1 66
with the principles set forth in this chapter.'
The FSIA provides for several exceptions to sovereign
immunity. 167 First, states are not immune from actions based on
commercial activities of the sovereign outside the territory of the
United States that have direct effect in the United States. 16 8 In
determining if a state is performing a commercial activity, "the issue

157.
Christopher P. Meade, Note, From Shanghai to Globocourt: An Analysis of
the "Comfort Women's" Defeat in Hwang v. Japan, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 211, 271,
(2002).
158.
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
159.
Id. at 1168-71.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 1170 (citing Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988)); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 149798 (11th Cir. 1986); Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1985).
Cf. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 791 (2d
Cir. 1980) (holding that the FSIA does not apply retroactively to case filed before
effective date of statute). Contra Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F.
Supp. 849, 851 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying FSIA to acts that arose before the Act's
effective date).
165.
Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
166.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2002)).
167.
Id. at 1171.
168.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2002)).
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is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs
(whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a
private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.' 169 The
threshold for direct effect in the United States is fairly low. 170 "To be
'direct' within the meaning of the FSIA an effect need not be
'substantial' or 'foreseeable' so long as it is more than 'purely trivial'
and 'it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's . . .
172
activity." '171 The second major exception to the FSIA is waiver.
Although it recognized the importance of human rights in
international law, the court rejected the contention that a state
impliedly waives its sovereign immunity when it acts beyond the
bounds of jus cogens international law. 173 The court was reluctant to
find a waiver of sovereign immunity because it did not agree to
arbitration or file responsive pleadings without raising the immunity
defense. 1 74 Ultimately, the court declined to assert jurisdiction
without a clearer grant by Congress:
We think that something more nearly express is wanted before we
impute t6 the Congress an intention that the federal courts assume
jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that might well be
brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas, presidentsfor-life, and murderous dictators of the world, from Idi Amin to Mao
175
Zedong.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also declined
to decide whether the FSIA applies retroactively to actions before
1952.176 In Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, fifteen former "comfort
women" filed suit against Japan alleging they were forced to serve as
177
sex-slaves to the Imperial Army of Japan during World War II.
Like the court in Princz, the Hwang court recognized strong
178
arguments in favor of retroactive application of the FSIA.
However, even assuming arguendo that the FSIA did apply, the 'court
held that none of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity
applied. 179 The court first held that Japan did not waive its sovereign
immunity because it did not indicate a willingness to be sued for

169.
Id. at 1172 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
613 (1992)); Millen Indus. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879,
884 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
170.
Id.
171.
Id. (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614).
172.
Id. at 1173.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 1174.
175
Id.
176.
Meade, supra note 157, at 271.
177.
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2001).
178.
Meade, supra note 157, at 271-72.
179.
Id.
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reparations in the Potsdam Declaration. 180 The court agreed with the
Princz decision, as have the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
that violations of jus cogens international law do not constitute an
18 1
implied waiver of sovereign immunity.
Even if a violation of jus cogens did serve as an implied waiver of
sovereign immunity, the comfort women would still need to prove
that the Japanese actually violated international law in order to
prevail on their ATCA claim. 182 As one author has explained,
although Filartiganoted that "it is clear that courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among nations of the world today," it is still very unclear
whether that holds true where the plaintiff brings a claim fifty or
sixty years after the alleged events. 183 Despite Filartiga'spreference
for applying the most current conception of international law, Japan
would have a strong claim that holding its 1940s-era conduct under
the microscope of 2000-era international law would punish Japan ex
post facto. 184 "The 'principle' that the legal effect of conduct should
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct
took place has timeless and universal appeal" in U.S.
185
jurisprudence.
Having rejected the claims of implied and explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity, the court then rejected the assertion that the
Japanese actions fell within the commercial exception. 186 The court
emphasized the context within which the Japanese allegedly operated
the brothels. 187 The court recognized that such establishments
"routinely exist as commercial ventures engaged in by private
parties," but explained that "Japan's alleged conduct did not occur in
this context."18 8
Although the court recognized that Japanese
soldiers paid a fee to use the comfort stations, it still held the state
was not engaged in a commercial activity. 189 As one commentator
points out, however, there may be little difference between the
kidnapping and forced prostitution endured by the comfort women
and the human trafficking and forced prostitution that still victimizes

180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 273.

182.

Id.

183.
184.
185.
(1997)).
186.
187.
188.
2001)).
189.

Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946
Id. at 276-77.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D.D.C.
Id. at 277.
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hundreds of thousands of women and children each year and
generates over seven billion dollars annually. 190
C. Statute of Limitations, the Impact of Treaties, and the
Nonjusticiable Question Doctrine
In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., the U.S. District Court of New
Jersey addressed the issues of the statute of limitations, the impact of
treaties upon claims brought under the ATCA, and the political
question doctrine. 191 Iwanowa claimed that "[b]y knowingly utilizing
unpaid, forced labor under inhuman conditions, [defendants] violated
the law of nations, including the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention."'192 The complaint alleged that Iwanowa "was literally
purchased, along with 38 other children from Rostock [sic], by a
representative of [the Germany Ford Werke Company].' 193 The court
explained that "[t]he use of unpaid, forced labor during World War II
violated clearly established norms of customary international law....
Such assertions suffice to support an allegation that Defendants
participated in slave trading." The court observed that most courts
recognize that the ATCA provides both federal subject matter
194
jurisdiction and a right of action for violations of international law.
Iwanowa was a citizen of the Soviet Union during World War 11.195
The court explained that the London Debt Agreement precluded her
196
pursuit of reparations against Ford Werke by judicial means.
"[O]nly the government of the country of which the forced laborer was
a national at the time the forced labor claims arose can pursue such
claims. In short, Iwanowa must press her individual claims through
197
the governments of the successor states to the U.S.S.R."'
Turning to the issue of statute of limitations, the Iwanowa court
acknowledged that the ATCA does not provide a specific statute of
limitations. 198 Therefore, the court must apply the "most closely
analogous statute of limitations under state law."199 However, the
court recognized a narrow exception when another federal statute or
rule "clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes,
and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make the [federal statute] a significantly more appropriate

190.

Id.

191.
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 474 (D.N.J. 1999).
Id. at 437.
192.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 441-42 (citing Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d. 353, 362-63 (D.N.J.
1998)). See also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
196.
Id. at 456.
197.
Id.
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Id. at 462.
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Id. (citing DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 152 (L983)).

1336

VANDERBILTIOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

IVOL. 35'1313

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking. '200 The court, following decisions
by other courts, chose to apply the statute of limitations in the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).201 The TVPA provides
for a ten-year statute of limitations. 20 2 Because the London Debt
Agreement precluded Iwanowa's individual claim until it was
replaced on March 15, 1991, the statute of limitations was tolled until
that date and would expire on March 15, 2001.203 The moratorium on

individual claims under the London Debt Agreement ended with the
ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in 1991.204

The ten-year

statute of limitations had not expired by the time Iwanowa filed this
action against Ford Werke in 1998.205

However, the statute of

limitations against Ford Werke's parent, Ford Motor Company, in the
United States was not tolled by the London Debt Agreement and had
therefore expired. 20 6 The court also held that Iwanowa's claims for
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit had expired under the
20 7
applicable state law statute of limitations of six years.
The Iwanowa court also dismissed Iwanowa's World War II
forced labor claims because they raised nonjusticiable political
questions. 20 8 "The Political Question Doctrine holds that a federal
court having jurisdiction over a dispute should decline to adjudicate it
on the ground that the case raises questions which should be
addressed by the political branches of government. '20 9 The political
question doctrine is of great importance in the area of foreign affairs:
The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political,
not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confined by our Constitution to
the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.
They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should only be undertaken by those directly responsible to
the people whose welfare they advance or peril. They are decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of
2 10
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.

200.
Id. (citing Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
201.
Id. (citing Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192-93 (D. Mass. 1995)).
202.
Id. at 462 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002)).
203.
Id. at 465.
204.
Id.
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Id. at 466.
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Id.
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Id. at 476.
208.
Id. at 483.
209.
Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.
Supp. 689, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
210.
Id. at 484 (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
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The court listed several reasons for avoiding political questions,
including (1) unmanageably large quantities of relevant materials, (2)
inability of parties to provide all materials necessary for a sound
judgment, (3) difficulty in predicting the political consequences of a
decision on the merits, (4) lack of applicable standards to formulate a
judgment on the merits, and (5) difficulty in reviewing decisions made
by political branches of government. 211 The court also expressed a
concern that a decision on the merits might represent a "lack of
212
The court
respect to the coordinate branches of government. '
reasoned that reparations have always been part of the negotiation
the issue falls
process after the conclusion of hostilities, and as such,
2 13
squarely within the power of the executive branch.
D. State Action in ForeignAffairs
In In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation,
Chinese and Korean nationals sought compensation from Japanese
companies for forced labor during World War 11. 21 4 Unlike U.S.
citizens, the action was not barred by the peace treaty with Japan
because the Chinese and Korean governments were not parties to
that agreement. 2 15 This case was unique because the California
legislature specifically provided a cause of action for individuals who
were used as forced labor by the Nazis and their allies during World
War 11. 2 16 The California government enacted the statute to "help
right the wrong which occurred over 50 years ago during World War
2 17
II when men, women and children were forced into slave labor."
However, the court rejected the California enactment because it
infringed on federal control of foreign affairs. 218 In addition to
rejecting the claims based on the California statute, the court also
held that the statute of limitations had expired on the ATCA
claims. 219 Like the court in Iwanowa, this court employed the tenyear statute of limitations from the TVPA.220 The court recognized
that the statute of limitations taken from the TVPA could be subject

Id.
211.
Id. at 485.
212.
Id.
213.
In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
214.
1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Id. at 1165 (analyzing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6 (Deering 2001)).
215.
Id. at 1173.
216.
Id. (quoting Governor Gray Davis of California who signed Cal. Civ. Proc.
217.
Code § 354.6 into law).
Id. at 1173-75.
218.
Id. at 1173-75, 1181.
219.
Id. at 1181.
220.
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to equitable tolling, but that the plaintiffs in this case failed to assert
22 1
that they were prevented from bringing their claims sooner.
These cases form the legal scaffolding upon which Holocaust
litigation has proceeded in the United States. 22'2 Most of the recent
cases involving Holocaust litigation have been conducted as class
actions because they are well-suited to resolving human rights issues
that often involve conduct toward an identifiable group or class of
persons. 22 3 Although the class action is one of the most complex
forms of federal litigation, "justice is often better served in mass tort
224
cases through 'collective, rather than disaggregative, processes.'
E. Holocaust ReparationsSettlements
In In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litigation, three separate trials
were combined for pretrial purposes. 225 The cases involved claims
against Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, and
Credit Suisse.2 26 The causes of action included breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment. 227 The banks were pressured to settle the disputes,
brought by twenty states and thirty cities that threatened to impose
sanctions on the banks "for not resolving the suit and meeting their
moral' and legal obligations. '22 8 The plaintiffs' lawyers also filed
additional actions in Washington, D.C. and California courts. 229 The
banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion to "targets and victims of Nazi
230
persecution" in a 1998 settlement.
In Germany, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Daimler-Benz,
Volkswagen, BMW, and others have been the subjects of multibillion-dollar lawsuits. 231 At least fifteen lawsuits were filed in 1999
alone against German companies that allegedly benefited from slave
labor under the Nazi regime. 23 2 As recently as 1999, German

221.
Id.
222.
Brown, supra note 121, at 564.
223.
Id. at 564-65.
224.
Id. at 565 (quoting David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 567-68 (1987)).
225.
Id. at 567.
226.
Id. at 566-68.
227.
Id. at 566.
228.
Id. at 567-68 (quoting Michael J. Bayzler, A Measure of Justice for
Holocaust Survivors, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 23, 1998).
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
Joan Gralla, WJC Weighs Sanctions Against Deutsche Bank, NAT'L POST,
Feb. 8, 1999, at C8.
232.
Never Too Late, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at 6.
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companies agreed to pay $1.8 billion in additional reparations to
238
Holocaust victims who had not received earlier compensation.
Reparations litigation is not limited to actions by Holocaust
survivors.
Although .discouraged- by the Chinese government,
Chinese citizens are actively seeking reparations in Chinese courts
against Japan for invasion of mainland China during World War
11.234 In 1998, the United States settled a class-action lawsuit filed
by twelve hundred Latin Americans of Japanese decent who were
interned during World War 11.235
F. Moral Underpinningsof JudicialResolutions
In the court setting, the controlling principle requires that the
state or the companies were unjustly enriched by seizures of property
or forced labor.2 36 The objective of the courts and the settlement
agreements is to return the value of the labor or property to the
victims. 23 7 However, the motivating force behind cases like In re
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and In re
Holocaust Victim Asset Litigation is often the perception by
legislatures and government officials of Jews as the ultimate victims
of the government actions during World War 11.238 Not only are the
former Allied Powers still motivated by a sense of empathy for the
suffering of the Jewish people, but the German companies and former
Nazi supporters are also eager to settle disputes to distance
themselves from the near-universal condemnation of the Nazi
regime. 239 Governments, banks, and companies alike have political
and economic incentives to throw off the label of Nazi sympathizers
and rejoin the civilized world. 240 As the next section examines the
claims of African states for reparations, bear in mind the possible
similarities between the universal condemnation of the Nazi regime
and the rejection of slavery.

233.

Report: German Firms to Pay 3 Billion Marks to Slave Labour Victims,

DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 14, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
234.
Agnes Cheung, War-claims Activist Warned, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 3, 1995, at 8.
235.
U.S. Will Pay Reparations to FormerLatin American Internees, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1998, at A19.
236.
See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
237. Id.
238.
Compare In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001), with Brown, supra note 121, at 564-68.
239.
See generally Brown, supra note 121.
240. Id.
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VIII. POTENTIAL AFRICAN REPARATIONS

A. Prohibitionof Slavery as Jus Cogens InternationalLaw
Any discussion of the prospect of African reparations must
necessarily begin with an assessment of the legal status of the
institutions of slavery and colonization. As discussed earlier, slavery
has been rejected by the United States and the international
community for over seventy-five years. 24 1 During that time, the
prohibition has been sufficiently incorporated into the customary
international law to be fairly characterized as a jus cogens
international law of human rights. The rejection of colonialism has
also been fully incorporated into customary international law,
although its claim to jus cogens status may be affirmed less
vigorously within the international community than that of slavery.
As a result of the universal condemnation of slavery, colonialism,
genocide, and war crimes, states generally possess universal
242
jurisdiction to define and punish violations of those basic rights.
However, as a possible lingering effect of the earlier international law
of near universal foreign immunity, 243 courts remain reluctant to
review the actions of foreign states, particularly when a significant
244
amount of time has lapsed.

B. African Reparations Under the,Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
One alternative is to bring an action in a U.S. court for violation
of the international law of human rights against those countries or
companies that perpetrated slavery and colonization against a state
in Africa. Courts in the United States can only exercise jurisdiction
in cases involving international law if they fall within one of the
exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 245 The
institution of slavery is arguably within the exception to the FSIA for
commercial activity. Although the Hwang court held that operation

241.
CompareU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with Slavery Convention, supra note 79.
242.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt.
IV, ch. 1, § 404 (1987).
243.
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
244.
See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 424 (D.N.J. 1999); see also
In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d. 1160 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
245.
Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168-69.
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of brothels by the Japanese government was not a commercial
activity, 246 that case is distinguishable from the institution of slavery.
In the case of the Imperial Army of Japan, the brothels operated
primarily for the purpose of satisfying the sexual needs of the troops
in order to further the military objectives of the Empire.2 47 In the
case of European conquest of the African states, however, the
institution of slavery and the conquest and colonization itself was a
means of furthering the commercial interests in labor and resources
of the European empires. The task of establishing slavery as a
commercial activity exception to the FSIA is eased to the extent that
African states can demonstrate that European governments have
coordinated their efforts with private shipping, mining, and
24 8
agricultural businesses to that end.
Additionally, African states can make a colorable argument that
the European powers and the United States have impliedly or
explicitly waived sovereign immunity as it applies to events before
1952 by imposing retroactive application of the FSIA and reparations
generally to Axis Powers after World War 11.249 To the extent that
those countries have held Germany accountable for reparations to
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, 250 African states could argue that
the same countries have exposed themselves to accountability for
their own misdeeds. This argument will necessarily run afoul of the
251
U.S. Supreme Court's concern for ex post facto prosecution.
Surmounting this obstacle will hinge upon the ability of the African
states to characterize the jus cogens status of the international
human rights law relating to slavery as a transcendent truth that
should have been recognized by the slave-trading states during the
time of slavery. This argument will necessarily take on a tone similar
to the criminal law concept that ignorance of the law is no defense.
The African states could argue that the slave-trading states can be
held liable for their actions even if they believed they were acting
within the norms of international law at the time. This position can
be fortified by pointing to the Swiss Banks and German companies
that have been held accountable for their collusion with the Nazis,
although they were acting within the bounds of international law at
the time.

246. Meade, supra note 157, at 276-77.
247.
Id.
248.
See id. (discussing government commercial activity in the context of slavery
and colonization).
249.
See id. (discussing the FISA and the Axis Powers after World War II).
250.
See Brown, supra note 121, at 566-68.
251.
Meade, supranote 157, at 273.
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C. African Reparations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
Another alternative is to file a suit for reparations in the United
States under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The primary
difficulty with this avenue of slavery reparations is the ten-year
statute of limitations derived from the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA).252 African states could argue that the statute of limitations
was tolled by the delayed development of a cause of action in
This argument reflects the condition of
international law. 253
customary international law that is formulated and developed
according to the evolving conception of human rights within the
international community. The African states would argue that a
cause of action did not exist and that, therefore, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the concept of the prohibition of
slavery as a facet of the jus cogens body of international law reached a
sufficient level of general acceptance., This argument is, of course,
under a
susceptible to the contention that a state cannot be liable
254
cause of action until that cause of action actually exists.
Alternatively, the African states could argue that the statute of
limitations was equitably tolled by the refusal of the slave-trading
states to recognize the jus cogens status of the prohibition of slavery.
This argument suggests that the continued practice of slavery until
the end of the nineteenth century and the survival of colonialism into
the twentieth century represent a fraudulent misrepresentation of
the true nature of human rights upon the international community by
slave-trading states. By employing this argument, the African states
place the slave-trading states in a "catch-22" scenario. From one
perspective, the, slave-trading states' continued insistence that
slavery is not a transcendent evil represents a continuation of that
fraud on the international community. However, acceptance of the
freedom from slavery as a universal right extending back through
time opens the slave-trading states to the same responsibility for
their actions. Additionally, African states that have remained in a
state of tutelage, as described by Judge Ammoun in Security Council
Resolution 276, might argue that their subordinate status on the
world stage entitles them to equitable tolling of their causes of action.
At the time of publication for this Note, a class action complaint
was initiated in federal district court that will present this equitable
tolling argument in the context of reparations for African-

252.
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 424, 462 (D.N.J. 1999).
Id.
253.
254.
This argument is similar to the familiar tort concept that a breach of duty
cannot exist unless a duty first exists.
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Americans. 255 The suit was filed against four companies in the
United States that allegedly participated in the slave trade. 256 The
first count of that action alleges conspiracy by the companies and
asserts that they acted individually and in concert with their industry
257
groups to profit from uncompensated labor derived from slavery.
The second count demands the production of records from the period
of slave trading. 258 The plaintiff class asserts that the defendants
knew or should have known of the existence of these records and that
the defendants should be required to produce them. 259 The third
count asserts that the defendants committed human rights violations
by enslaving and persecuting the ancestors of the African American
class members. 260 Counts four and five allege conversion and unjust
enrichment, respectively, for the failure by the defendant companies
to compensate the enslaved ancestors of the plaintiff class for their
labor. 26 1 The complaint asserts that the general lack of reliable
shipping records from the period, the unwillingness of .companies to
release their records, and the reluctance on the part of Congress to
address the issue of reparations justify the delay by the plaintiff class
in bringing this action. 262 Arguably, the plaintiffs should not be made
to suffer because of the lack of diligence in record keeping and
263
reluctance in producing those records by the defendant companies.
D. African Reparationsand the Nonjusticiable Question Doctrine
Whether African states pursue slavery reparations under
international law by way of the FSIA, or as a tort under the ATCA,
they will still have to contend with the nonjusticiable question
doctrine. First and foremost, the African states should argue that the
slave-trading states are completely unwilling to negotiate or consider
any form of compensation or reparations by legislative or executive
means. The African states should point to the overwhelming size of
the injustice perpetrated over centuries of colonial domination and
enslavement as a dual indicator of both the reason why treaty
settlement is impossible and why judicial remedy is essential. The
African states should argue that the debt is so great that slavetrading states will never give repayment an adequate consideration.

255.
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellman v. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp.,
45 (E.D.N.Y. filed 2002), available at www.findlaw.com [hereinafter
Complaint].
256.
Id.
27-31.
257.
Id.
50-51.
258.
Id. 1 52-54.
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
57-61.
261.
Id.
62-70.
262.
Id.
45-49.
263.
Id.
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For the same reason, however, African states should argue that
it is imperative that some organ of government address the issue.
Judicial resolution of the reparation issue is necessary because treaty
or legislative action by the other branches of Western governments is
unlikely. To strengthen this argument, the African states should
actively pursue settlements by treaty or U.N. resolution. On the one
hand, the potential for litigation may help the African states achieve
their primary objectives of debt forgiveness and a formal apology
through international agreement. On the other hand, the failure to
reach such an agreement will fortify the assertion that diplomatic
resolution is impossible.
E. Adequate Evidence to Document the African Injury
Underlying the issue of the nonjusticiable question doctrine and
of litigation generally is the ability of the African states to adequately
document the injuries sustained from centuries of slavery and
colonization. Not only must the African states locate those companies
that profited from the slave trade that are still in existence, but they
must also obtain whatever documentation may still exist of the
numbers and origins of slaves transported to the New World.
Obviously, slave traders and slave owners in the new world would not
have kept detailed records of the identities and origins of their
property. Even if such records did exist, they most likely would not
have withstood the passage of time. However, the African states
should argue that equitable doctrines should prevent the slavetrading states from continuing to prosper from their lack of diligent
record keeping. At the very least, the African states could pursue
their objective of debt forgiveness by claiming that the accumulated
national debts of their countries is a rough approximation of the
damage sustained at the hands of Imperial Europe.
F. The Impact of Moral Outrageon African Reparations
In assessing the potential for slavery reparations, the impact of
international moral outrage on the success of Holocaust reparations
For that reason, the likelihood of
should not be overlooked.
reparations for African states may be expected to be directly
proportional to its similarity with the Holocaust situation. On its
face, it appears that the Africans have suffered to a similar degree
under slavery and colonization as did the Jews under the Nazis.
Certainly, the dual horrors of slavery and colonization oppressed and
subjugated a comparable number of persons as the Nazi Holocaust.
The duration of that suffering was also far greater that the six years
of World War II. Therefore, the carnage of slavery and colonization
can be fairly characterized as an African Holocaust.

20021

THE AFRICAN HOLOCA UST

1345

However, there may be a fundamental difference in the lack of
intent to harm the African people in the same way the Nazis intended
to harm the Jews. There were certainly legitimate political and
economic reasons for the countries in the West to engage in
No European country could afford to withdraw
colonization.
unilaterally from the race to colonize, or fail to utilize fully new
colonies through slave labor without sacrificing its own security at
home. It is much more difficult for courts or countries to accept an
assignment of moral culpability when there is no clear evidence of
malice.
At most, the colonial powers are guilty of recklessly
disregarding the interests of the African states when pursuing their
own survival.
Likewise, a significant difference exists between the Allied
Powers laying blame on a handful of surviving Nazi leaders and
laying blame on generations of their own ancestors. This point helps
to illustrate precisely why the reparations issue, particularly in a
courtroom setting, tends to exaggerate tensions. If the issue was
raised entirely in a political setting, the West would have room to
maneuver.
It could empathize with the descendants of former
colonial subjects and propose measures to offset the lingering effects
of colonization without necessarily making a formal apology or
publicly accepting blame. Similarly, proponents of the reparations
movement could obtain the economic relief they seek in the form of
debt forgiveness with much less opposition from the West, assuming
African states forego a formal apology and acknowledgment of
wrongdoing by European nations. By keeping their options open in
treaty negotiations, the Western and African states can reduce
tensions and concentrate on a realistic evaluation of the merits of the
reparation claims and the secondary benefits of, for instance, a
stabilized African market for European goods.
However, when the issue is presented in the form of litigation,
the stakes are raised. Even though the parties can still negotiate a
settlement, any settlement is, at least in the eyes of the observing
public, both an admission of responsibility and an acknowledgement
of the moral legitimacy of the reparations cause in proportion to the
amount of the settlement. In litigation, the parties are engaged in a
type of formalized battle that removes political alternatives. The
motivation to fight for the cause itself and to win a moral victory in
the form of a formal apology is more likely to move to the forefront in
litigation. Likewise, the slave-trading states will be encouraged to
avoid an apology at all costs in order to prevent any admission of
guilt. The net effect is that each side will be more likely to be
consumed by the desire to hold the moral high ground, or to obtain a
perceived moral victory or vindication at the expense of the real
objectives. For the African states, there is a greater risk that tempers
will flare, as they did at the World Conference Against Racism. As a
result, they will not receive the debt forgiveness they so desperately
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need. The West, of course, wants to put the entire issue to rest, but
not at the price of its dignity and cultural heritage. England, for
instance, even in its post-colonial state, is not prepared to sacrifice
the legacy of the British Empire because of the nostalgic sentiments
and feelings of national identity that underlie the retention of its
monarchy. Similarly, the United States has reason to fear that a
settlement with African states regarding slavery could open the
floodgates to reparation actions by African American descendents of
former slaves in the United States.
There may be some very good arguments for why the West
should not be held responsible for colonization and slavery. Of
course, no Western democracy that considers itself to be morally
sophisticated would ever make such arguments. An open defense of
slavery would have the same public consequences as a defense of the
Nazis. However, it is not entirely clear that slavery or colonization is
a transcendent moral evil comparable to the extermination of the
Jews, for which all people at all times should be held accountable.
Slavery was a thriving institution long before the United States or
the Roman Catholic Church existed. It did not become morally
reprehensible until we, as a civilization, decided it was morally
reprehensible.
In the United States, that recognition of the
reprehensibility of slavery took four bloody years of Civil War and a
constitutional amendment. The remnants of colonization lasted even
longer.

IX. CONCLUSION

If the international community chooses to assign moral
culpability to the West for colonization and slavery, then that is its
prerogative. However, perhaps that choice should be recognized as
just that, a choice. The international community may be better
served if it casts off any illusions it has about an overarching,
permanent moral framework that applies equally to all wrongdoers at
all times. The recognition of the international law of human rights as
an evolving moral framework may help European and African states
alike to set aside the issue of blame and apology for slavery in order
to concentrate on the continuing plight of the African continent and
the strained relations between nations.
In discussing the potential for African reparations, lasting peace
must not be forgotten as the ultimate goal. Although it is feasible to
shape the dynamic international law to support or deny reparations
for slavery and colonization, this must not be done in a way that
inspires lingering resentment. In the end, it is that lingering
resentment that has created this confrontation. The underlying
moral sentiments must be recognized and openly discussed to reach a
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final peace that is acceptable to everyone involved. Otherwise, this
problem will arise again in the future.
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